Bootstrapping Privacy Compliance in Big Data Systems

### Giulia Fanti Based on slides by Anupam Datta CMU

Fall 2019

### Administrative

### HW2 will be released this week

- Stay tuned
- How did Docker recitation go?

D

## Quiz on Canvas


Take the quiz on your laptops/tablets/devices

- Please do not look back at your notes
  - these quizzes do not affect your grade, so you should just try to do your best without gaming the grade
- I0 minutes

# Bootstrapping Privacy Compliance in Big Data Systems

S. Sen, S. Guha, A. Datta, S. Rajamani, J. Tsai, J. M. Wing Proceedings of 35th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy May 2014.

# Privacy Compliance for Bing




### Setting:


Auditor has access to source code



# The Privacy Compliance Challenge



### A Streamlined Audit Workflow



### A Streamlined Audit Workflow

Legal Team Crafts Policy

Legal*ease* A formal policy specification lang

Grok Data inventory with policy datatyp

Code analysis, developer annotations

Developer Writes Code Workflow for privacy compliance

**Legalease,** usable yet formal policy specification language

**Grok,** bootstrapped data inventory for big data systems


Potei

Potential violations

Scalable implementation for Bing

Verifies Complian

## Privacy as Restrictions on Personal Information Flow



## A Streamlined Audit Workflow



# Specification: Legalease

Usable. Expressive. Precise. Usable by lawyers and privacy champs.

Expressive enough for real-world policies. Precise semantics for local reasoning.



# Legalease: Components

- Each statement is a clause reasoning about attributes
- Clauses
  - Allow
  - Deny
  - Except

### Attributes

- InStore
- UseForPurpose
- AccessByRole
- DataType

## Legalease : Syntax

Policy Clause  $C ::= D \mid A$ 

```
Allow Clause A ::=
```

Attribute T ::=

```
Deny Clause D ::= \mathsf{DENY} T_1 \cdots T_n \mathsf{EXCEPT} A_1 \cdots A_m
                     | DENY T_1 \cdots T_n
                  ALLOW T_1 \cdots T_n EXCEPT D_1 \cdots D_m
                      | ALLOW T_1 \cdots T_n
                        \langle \text{attribute-name} \rangle v_1 \cdots v_l
Value v ::= \langle \text{attribute-value} \rangle
```

# Legalease

14

### **DENY** Datatype IPAddress

UseForPurpose Advertising

### We will **not** use **full IP Address** for **Advertising**.

# Designed for Usability

#### **DENY** Datatype IPAddress

UseForPurpose Advertising

#### EXCEPT

ALLOW

Datatype IPAddress:Truncated

#### ALLOW

UseForPurpose AbuseDetect

#### EXCEPT

16

**DENY** Datatype

IPAddress, Accou

### Exceptions

How legal texts are structured One-to one correspondence

### Local Reasoning

Each exception refines its immediate parent

Formally proven property

H. DeYoung, D. Garg, L. Jia, D. Kaynar, and A. Datta, "Experiences in the logical specification of the HIPAA and GLBA privacy laws"

# Legalease : In Action

**DEN**Y Datatype IPAddress

UseForPurpose Advertising

#### EXCEPT

ALLOW

Datatype IPAddress:Truncated

#### ALLOW

UseForPurpose AbuseDetect

#### EXCEPT

17

DENY Datatype IPAddress, AccountInfo

Policy Labers

*Datatype*: IPAddress, AccountInfo *UseForPurpose*: AdsAbuseDetection

We will not use full IP Address for Advertising. IP Address may be used for detecting abuse. In such cases, it will not be combined with account inform on.


### Primer on Lattices

- On document camera
- Posets
- Lattices

### Rules for ALLOW and DENY


Examples

# A Lattice of Policy Labels



- If "IPAddress" use is allowed then so is everything below it
- If "IPAddress:Truncated" use is denied then so is everything above it

# Policy Types : Concept Lattices




InStore Lattice

20

UseForPurpose Lattice AccessByRole Lattice

# Policy Labels : Datatypes



### **Formal Semantics**

$$\frac{T^G \sqsubseteq T^C}{\mathsf{ALLOW} \ T^C \ \mathsf{EXCEPT} \ D_1 \cdots D_m \ \mathsf{denies} \ T^G} (A_2)$$

Based on Lattice Orderings on Policy Types

### **Formal Semantics**

$$\frac{T^G \sqsubseteq T^C \quad \exists_i D_i \text{ denies } T^G}{\text{ALLOW } T^C \text{ EXCEPT } D_1 \cdots D_m \text{ denies } T^G}$$
(A2)

Recursively check exceptions ALLOW clauses have DENY clauses as exceptions Top Level clause determines Blacklist/Whitelist