18734: Foundations of Privacy

#### Differentially Private Recommendation Systems (cont'd)

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Slides by Anupam Datta, Jeremiah Blocki

Fall 2019


## Administrative

- HW2 out tonight
  - Differential privacy and deanonymization
- Project proposals
  - If you got marked down for your project, you can share new project idea with staff for feedback

### Definition from last time...

What is the support of a probability distribution?

A: Set of values with nonzero probability mass





## Canvas Quiz

#### I0 minutes

#### Last time:

## Differentially Private Recommender Systems: Building Privacy into the Netflix Prize Contenders

Frank McSherry and Ilya Mironov

KDD 2019



## Netflix Predictions – High Level

Q(i,j) – "How would user i rate movie j?"

- Predicted rating may typically depend on
  - Global average rating over all movies and all users
  - Average movie rating of user i
  - Average rating of movie j
  - Ratings user i gave to similar movies
  - Ratings similar users gave to movie j

Sensitivity may be small for many of these queries

## What do we need to make predictions?

For a large class of prediction algorithms it suffices to have:


- Gavg average rating for all movies by all users
- Mavg average rating for each movie by all users
- Average Movie Rating for each user
- Movie-Movie Covariance Matrix (COV)

Differentially Private Recommender Systems (High Level)


To respect approximate differential privacy publish

- Gavg + NOISE
- Mavg + NOISE
- COV + NOISE
- GS(Gavg), GS(Mavg) are very small so they can be published with little noise (e.g., Laplacian)
- GS(COV) requires more care (our focus)
- Don't publish average ratings for users (used in per-user prediction phase using k-NN or other algorithms)


#### Movie-Movie Covariance Matrix




#### Movie-Movie Covariance Matrix




#### Movie-Movie Covariance Matrix



## Example



#### Example



## Goal

- Come up with differentially-private method of computing these covariance matrices
- How should we do this?

## Covariance Matrix Sensitivity

$$\operatorname{Cov} = \sum_{u} \tilde{r}_{u} \ \tilde{r}_{u}^{T}$$

$$\|\operatorname{Cov}^{a} - \operatorname{Co}\nu^{b}\| = \|\tilde{r}_{u}^{a}\tilde{r}_{u}^{a^{T}} - \tilde{r}_{u}^{b}\tilde{r}_{u}^{b^{T}}\|$$

$$\leq \left\|\tilde{r}_{u}^{a} - \tilde{r}_{u}^{b}\right\| \times (\left\|\tilde{r}_{u}^{a}\right\| + \left\|\tilde{r}_{u}^{b}\right\|)$$

- Prove this with a neighbor
- Could be large if a user's rating has large spread or if a user has rated many movies

## Covariance Matrix Trick I

Center and clamp all ratings around averages. If we use clamped ratings then we reduce the sensitivity of our function.

$$\widehat{r}_{ui} = \begin{cases} -B, & \text{if } r_{ui} - \overline{r}_u < -B, \\ r_{ui} - \overline{r}_u, & \text{if } -B \leq r_{ui} - \overline{r}_u < B, \\ B, & \text{if } B \leq r_{ui} - \overline{r}_u. \end{cases}$$

## Example (B = 1)

 $r_{u1} = \langle | 4.2 | 2 \rangle$ User I: 3 >  $\overline{r_{u1}} = \frac{4.2 + 2 + 3}{3} \approx 3.07$  $\widehat{r_{u1}} = \langle | \overline{1} \rangle$ -.07 >  $\min\{B, 4.2 - 3.07\}$  $\max\{-B, 2 - 3.07\}$ 

## Covariance Matrix Trick II

Carefully weight the contribution of each user to reduce the sensitivity of the function. Users who have rated more movies are assigned lower weight.

$$\operatorname{Cov} = \sum_{u} w_{u} \widehat{r}_{u} \widehat{r}_{u}^{T} + \operatorname{Noise}^{d \times d}$$

• Where  $e_{ui}$  is 1 if user u rated movie i and  $w_u = \frac{1}{||e_u||_2}$ 


# Publishing the Covariance Matrix

Theorem 5 from paper: If ratings vectors r<sup>a</sup> and r<sup>b</sup> have at most one rating different, then for appropriate parameter settings, we have:

$$\|w_{u}^{a} \widehat{r}_{u}^{a} \widehat{r}_{u}^{aT} - w_{u}^{b} \widehat{r}_{u}^{b} \widehat{r}_{u}^{bT}\|_{2} \leq (1 + 2\sqrt{2})B^{2}$$

Add independent Gaussian noise proportional to this sensitivity bound to each entry in covariance matrix

## **Experimental Results**



## Note About Results

• Granularity: One *rating* present in  $D_1$  but not in  $D_2$ 

- Accuracy is much lower when one user is present in D<sub>1</sub> but not in D<sub>2</sub>
- Intuition: Given query Q(i, j) the database D-u[i] gives us no history about user i.
- Approximate Differential Privacy
  - ▶ Gaussian Noise added according to L<sub>2</sub> Sensitivity
  - Clamped Ratings (B = I) to further reduce noise


#### Summary

- Why did we talk about this paper?
  - Takes a complicated task (DP recommendation system)
  - Turns it into well-defined simpler task (DP covariance matrix)
- In general, you need to either
  - Bound the sensitivity of your desired function
  - Change the model to have bounded sensitivity
- What was their approach?
  - Use a bound on the sensitivity of covariance
  - Use the bound to design tools for limiting sensitivity


#### Next: Local Differential Privacy


### Different models

Global (database) differential privacy



#### Local differential privacy






• We say mechanism Q is  $\epsilon$ -locally differentially private if

$$\sup_{S,x,x'\in\mathcal{X}}\frac{Q(S|X=x)}{Q(S|X=x')} \le e^{\epsilon},$$



## Example: Measuring Drug Use

Question: Have you consumed illegal drugs in the last week?



- Randomized response (Warner):
  - If heads, answer truth
  - If tails, random answer

$$\frac{P(U = Y \mid X = Y) = 0.75}{P(U = Y \mid X = N) = 0.25} = e^{\log 3}$$

# Local Differential Privacy

- Widely used in practice
  - Google
  - Apple
- Mechanism is applied to privatize data itself
  - I.e., query function f(x) = x
- No notion of neighboring databases anymore
  - Compare P(output | input)
- Plausible deniability protects users from:
  - aggregator
  - hackers
  - surveillance