
Bootstrapping Privacy Compliance in Big Data Systems

Anupam Datta CMU

Fall 2016

Privacy Compliance for Bing




Setting:


Auditor has access to source code



The Privacy Compliance Challenge



A Streamlined Audit Workflow



A Streamlined Audit Workflow

Legal Team

Crafts Policy

Encode

Legalease

A formal policy specification lang

Grok

Data inventory with policy dataty

Code analysis, developer annotations

Developer

Writes Code

Workflow for privacy compliance

Interprets Policy

Legalease, usable yet formal policy specification language

Grok, bootstrapped data inventory for big data systems

Update Grok


Potential violations

Scalable implementation for Bing


Fix code

Verifies Compliance

Privacy as Restrictions on Personal Information Flow



A Streamlined Audit Workflow



Specification: Legalease

Usable. Expressive. Precise.

Usable by lawyers and privacy champs.


Expressive enough for real-world policies.

Precise semantics for local reasoning.

Legalease: Syntax


```
Policy Clause C::=D\mid A
Deny Clause D::=DENY \ T_1\cdots T_n \ EXCEPT \ A_1\cdots A_m
|DENY \ T_1\cdots T_n \ ALLOW \ T_1\cdots T_n \ EXCEPT \ D_1\cdots D_m
|ALLOW \ T_1\cdots T_n \ Attribute \ T::= \langle attribute-name \rangle \ v_1\cdots v_l
|Value \ v::= \langle attribute-value \rangle
```

Legalease




We will **not** use **full IP Address** for **Advertising**.

Legalease




We will **not** use **full IP Address** for **Advertising**.
IP Address may be used for **detecting abuse**. In such cases, it will not be combined with **account information**.

Designed for Usability




Legalease: In Action



Datatype: IPAddress, AccountInfo UseForPurpose: AdsAbuseDetection

We will not use full IP Address for Advertising. IP Address may be used for detecting abuse. In such cases, it will not be combined with account inform

A Lattice of Policy Labels



- If "IPAddress" use is allowed then so is everything below it
- If "IPAddress:Truncated" use is denied then so is everything above it

Designed for Precision

Policy Clause
$$C$$
 ::= $D \mid A$ Deny Clause D ::= DENY $T_1 \cdots T_n$ EXCEPT $A_1 \cdots A_m$ | DENY $T_1 \cdots T_n$ EXCEPT $D_1 \cdots D_m$ | ALLOW $D_1 \cdots D_m$ | ALLOW $D_2 \cdots D_m$ | ALLOW $D_3 \cdots D_m$ | Attribute $D_3 \cdots D_m$ | Attribute

GRAMMAR FOR LEGALEASE

$$\frac{T^G \not\sqsubseteq T^C}{\mathsf{ALLOW}\ T^C\ \mathsf{EXCEPT}\ D_1 \cdots D_m\ \mathsf{denies}\ T^G} \ \ (\mathsf{A}_1)$$

$$\frac{T^G \sqsubseteq T^C\ \exists_i D_i\ \mathsf{denies}\ T^G}{\mathsf{ALLOW}\ T^C\ \mathsf{EXCEPT}\ D_1 \cdots D_m\ \mathsf{denies}\ T^G} \ \ (\mathsf{A}_2)$$

$$\frac{T^G \sqsubseteq T^C\ \forall_i D_i\ \mathsf{allows}\ T^G}{\mathsf{ALLOW}\ T^C\ \mathsf{EXCEPT}\ D_1 \cdots D_m\ \mathsf{allows}\ T^G} \ \ (\mathsf{A}_3)$$

$$\frac{\bot \in T^G \sqcap T^C}{\mathsf{DENY}\ T^C\ \mathsf{EXCEPT}\ A_1 \cdots A_m\ \mathsf{allows}\ T^G} \ \ (\mathsf{D}_1)$$

$$\frac{\bot \not\in T^G \sqcap T^C\ \exists_i A_i\ \mathsf{allows}\ T^G \sqcap T^C}{\mathsf{DENY}\ T^C\ \mathsf{EXCEPT}\ A_1 \cdots A_m\ \mathsf{allows}\ T^G} \ \ (\mathsf{D}_2)$$

$$\frac{\bot \not\in T^G \sqcap T^C\ \forall_i A_i\ \mathsf{denies}\ T^G \sqcap T^C\ \mathsf{DENY}\ T^C\ \mathsf{EXCEPT}\ A_1 \cdots A_m\ \mathsf{denies}\ T^G \ \ (\mathsf{D}_3)$$

TABLE III

INFERENCE RULES FOR LEGALEASE

Designed for Expressivity (Bing, October 2013)

ALLOW EXCEPT

DENY DataType IPaddress:Expired

DENY DataType UniqueIdentifier:Expired

DENY DataType SearchQuery, PII InStore Store

DENY DataType UniqueIdentifier, PII InStore Store

DENY DataType BBEPData UseForPurpose Advertising

DENY DataType BBEPData, PII InStore Store

DENY DataType BBEPData:Expired

DENY DataType UserProfile, PII InStore Store

DENY DataType PII UseForPurpose Advertising DENY DataType PII InStore AdStore

DENY *DataType* SearchQuery *UseForPurpose* Sharing EXCEPT

ALLOW DataType SearchQuery:Scrubbed

- ⟨ "[we remove] cookies and other cross session identifiers, after 18 months"
- ¬ "We store search terms (and the cookie IDs associated with search terms) separately from any account information that directly identifies the user, such as name, e-mail address, or phone numbers."
- ¬ "we take steps to store [information collected through the Bing Bar Experience Improvement Program] separately from any account information we may have that directly identifies you, such as name, e-mail address, or phone numbers"
- ⟨ "we delete the information collected through the Bing Bar Experience Program at eighteen months."
- ¬ "we store page views, clicks and search terms used for ad targeting separately
 from contact information you may have provided or other data that directly
 identifies you (such as your name, e-mail address, etc.)."
- ⊲ "our advertising systems do not contain or use any information that can
 personally and directly identify you (such as your name, email address and
 phone number)."

Designed for Expressivity (Google, October 2013)


ALLOW EXCEPT
DENY DataType PII UseForPurpose Sharing


EXCEPT
ALLOW DataType PII:OptIn
EXCEPT
ALLOW AccessByRole Affiliates
EXCEPT
ALLOW UseForPurpose Legal

DENY DataType DoubleClickData, PII
EXCEPT
ALLOW DataType DoubleClickData, PII:Optin

- ¬ "We do not share personal information with companies, organizations and individuals outside of Google unless one of the following circumstances apply:"
- ⟨ "We require opt-in consent for the sharing of any sensitive personal information."
- ⟨ "We provide personal information to our affiliates or other trusted businesses or persons to process it for us"
- "We will not combine DoubleClick cookie information with personally identifiable information unless we have your opt-in consent"

Legalease Usability





Survey taken by 12 policy authors within Microsoft

Encode Bing data usage policy after a brief tutorial


Time spent

2.4 mins on the tutorial


14.3 mins on encoding policy

High overall correctness


A Streamlined Audit Workflow



A Streamlined Audit Workflow



Map-Reduce Programming Systems




Scope, Hive, Dremel

Data in the form of Tables

Code Transforms Columns to Columns


No Shared State Limited Hidden Flows

```
users =
    SELECT _name, _age FROM datasetAB
user_tag =
    SELECT GenerateTag(_name, _age)
    FROM users
OUTPUT user_tag TO datasetC
```



Purpose Labels

Annotate programs with purpose labels




Purpose Labels

Annotate programs with purpose labels

Initial Data Labels

Heuristics and Annotations



Purpose Labels


Annotate programs with purpose labels

Initial Data Labels

Heuristics and Annotations


Flow Labels

Source labels propagated via data flow graph



D. E. Denning. "A lattice model of secure information flow"

A Lattice of Policy Labels



- If "Profile" use is allowed then so is everything below it
- If "Name" use is denied then so is everything above it

Implicit flows

```
users =
   SELECT Name, Age FROM datasetAB

users_35 =
   SELECT _name
   FROM users
   WHERE (_age > 35)

OUTPUT users_35 TO Profile
```

Beyond direct flows discussed in healthcare audit examples

Map-Reduce

Map

Operate on rows in parallel eg. filtering

Reduce

Combine groups of rows eg. aggregation

```
users =
    SELECT Name, Age FROM datasetAB

users_35 =
    SELECT _name, _age
    FROM users
    WHERE (_age > 35)

ages_35 =
    SELECT _age, COUNT(_name) AS Profile
    FROM users_35
    GROUP BY _age

OUTPUT ages_35 TO datasetC
```

Combine Noisy Sources

Carefully curated regular expressions

Leverages developer conventions

Significant Noise

Variable Name Analysis

Expensive

Low Noise

Developer Annotations


Very Expensive

Definitive

Need very few of these

Auditor Verification


Why Bootstrapping Grok Works



A small number of annotations is enough to get off the ground.

Pick the nodes which will label the most of the graph

~200 annotations label 60% of nodes



Scale






Fig. 9. Number of GROK data flow graph nodes added each day

- > 77,000 jobs run each day
 - By 7000 entities
 - ▶ 300 functional groups
- I.I million unique lines of code
 - ▶ 21% changes on avg, daily
 - ▶ 46 million table schemas
 - ▶ 32 million files
- Manual audit infeasible
- Information flow analysis takes ~30 mins daily

Nightly Compliance **Process**






Generate Manual report

prizedit celedineettss 300K+

Audit

teams

A Streamlined Audit Workflow



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Crafts Policy

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Legalease

A formal policy specification langi

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Data inventory with policy dataty

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
Fix code

Verifies Compliance


Reference

S. Sen, S. Guha, A. Datta, S. Rajamani, J. Tsai, J. M. Wing, Bootstrapping Privacy Compliance in Big Data Systems, in Proceedings of 35th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 2014.

Policy Labels: Datatypes



Policy Types: Concept Lattices




InStore Lattice

Formal Semantics

$$\frac{T^G \sqsubseteq T^C}{\mathsf{ALLOW}\ T^C\ \mathsf{EXCEPT}\ D_1 \cdots D_m\ \mathsf{denies}\ T^G} \ (\mathsf{A}_2)$$

Based on Lattice Orderings on Policy Types

Formal Semantics



Recursively check exceptions

ALLOW clauses have DENY clauses as exceptions
Top Level clause determines
Blacklist/Whitelist