(Lec05) BDDs Applied: Finite State Machine Verific

What you know

- Representations: Cube lists, BDDs
- Manipulations: URP attacks on cubes, implementation for BDDs
- Useful computations
 - > Are these 2 blocks of logic doing the same thing for all inputs?
 - \triangleright Build a BDD for each and see if they are identical

What you don't know

- Cool ways people apply BDDs out in real world
- **Example: Verifying logic with any kind of time-varying behavior**
- ▶ Important application: Finite State Machines
 - > I give you 2 different FSM implementations
 - > You tell me: are they behaviorally equivalent...
 - > ...ie, for same input stream, will they make identical outputs?
- ▶ This is a whole new problem...

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Where Are We?

▼ Something *really* new, made possible by BDDs: *Formal Verif.*

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Introduction Advanced Boolean algebra JAVA Review Formal verification 2-Level logic synthesis Multi-level logic synthesis Technology mapping Placement Routing Static timing analysis Electrical timing analysis Geometric data structs & apps

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Handouts

Physical

► This lecture -- Lec05 Formal Verification

▼Electronic

- Project I (will be shortly...) on the web site. In project I, we give you the skeleton of a BDD package in JAVA, and you get to complete it, and then try to apply it to a portfolio of common gate-level logic test/verification problems.
- ▶ HW2 is also (still out) on the web site. HW2 covers lectures 3, 4 (BDD basics and internals) but not lecture 5 (FSM verification).

> Some HW2 bug fixes will also appear shortly

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Formal Verification: Who Cares...?

Computer Stocks Tumble Over Chip Flaw

By Blaumburg business means	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Shares of computer companies tumbled vesterday because of con-	Intel i
cern about a flaw in the Intel Corpo- ration's top-of-the-line Pentium chip. Although the flaw, which was dis- closed last week, affects only com-	poor I Pentit
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satisfaction," and John Lasio, a computer analysis at Paine Webber, in a report. Intel and it would not begin shu-ping here chips without the flaw for several works. "This is a public wha form disaster, and it puts intel in an emberrassing itiliation," and Drev.

Intel, for one...

- They simulated the divider a whole lot
- > They still missed some inputs that made errors ▶ Result, the Pentium FDIV bug, lots of bad press,
- lots and lots of money lost
- ▶ Formal verification techniques are now capable of finding errors like these in complex designs



By RICHARD B. SCHMITT

By Richards E. Schwirtz Staff bejortes of the Wall. Stretct Journal. Lawsults against Intel Corp. over its fassed Fendum chip ace rapidly multiply-ing, even as debate continues over how much harm the device's inability to do certain complex math calculations will available. CALISE

The legal assault, including at least 10 suits in three states as of late yesterday, accuses the Santa Clara, Calif., chip maker

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Formal Verification: This Lecture

▼ Pick one significant problem: FSM verification

- Review finite state machines (from basic digital designs)
- Show why this is a hard problem
- Show a clever attack on the verification problem that exercises a lot of what you know about BDDs and their capabilities

New stuff here

- Dealing with temporal behavior: we want to know the FSM works for all patterns of inputs, over all future clock ticks
- Representing this temporal behavior using Boolean functions
- Reasoning about this behavior
- Turning the whole shebang into a sequence of symbolic computations you could do with C code + a good BDD package

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Combinational Equivalence Checking

Reminder

- > This is the easiest "formal verification" sort of problem
- > You have 2 different implementations of the same function
- > They have identical input and output variables
- ► Your task: determine if they give identical outputs over all possible inputs, or find a counterexample where the outputs differ

Why is this easy?

- ▶ Build a BDD for each function. If they are identical, you get the identical same BDD pointer for each one.
- ► If not identical, build BDD for (function F) ⊕ (function G) and find satisfying inputs for this new function. These inputs make F != G!
- ▶ Easy since it uses all the standard BDD stuff.
- ▶ No notion of time in here, no sequences of inputs over clock ticks

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FSM Equivalance Checking

This is why it's hard

- Can't just look at the logic now and say "yeah, they're the same"
- ▶ Need a whole new, systematic method that deals with temporal aspect of things here, and the possible differences in encodings









2. Symbolic Representation of FSMs

▼ Idea is to represent the set of all legal transitions





















Iterated Reachability Analysis

■ Mechanically, how?

- Need to look close at the structure of the R sets
- > Think about sets like Venn diagrams: what's inside what?
- If you know R_k , what else is there to get to R_{k+1} ...?





























Cross Product Machine

■ Given 2 FSMs to check...





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Summary
▼ FSM verification is important, but different
Have to worry about time, about equivalent outputs over all possible future inputs
Not just simple block-to-block combinational equivalence
▼ Big ideas
 Symbolic representation of FSMs transition relation Reachability analysis
Cross product machine with "special" satisfiability output
Transforms the temporal problem into another series of do-able BDD exercises
Hugely important application of BDD analysis out in the real world these days
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