

18-733 Spring 2016

Semantic Security Review

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Topics Covered

- Stream Ciphers
 - One Time Pad
 - Many Time Pad
- PRNG
 - Statistical tests
 - Security game for secure PRNG
- Perfect Secrecy
- Semantic Security
 - Security Game Definitions

Security Games – Overview



Security Games – Blind Taste Test




Adversary

Please give me a random drink




Challenger


Security Games – Blind Taste Test



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Security Games – Blind Taste Test



Security Games - Adversary


- Wine Tasting Adversaries:
 - People who have never tasted wine
 - People who sometimes drink wine
 - People who often drink wine
 - Professional wine taster (sommelier)
- Two samples w_1, w_2 are indistinguishable iff they are indistinguishable w.r.t. all reasonable adversaries

Semantic Security


- We know what properties we want our constructions to have in an ideal world
- If we can show that our real constructions are **“indistinguishable”** from these ideal constructions, then we can use them as if they have these properties

Example: PRNG

- Ideal: Sequence of truly random bits
- Actual: Pseudorandom sequence of bits




Example: IND-CPA (Indistinguishable with respect to Chosen Plaintext Attack)



$$Adv(A) = \Pr[A(Enc(k, m_0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(Enc(k, m_1)) = 1]$$

Example Homework Question (IND-CPA\$)

- Consider the following game



Question: Let Enc be an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, is Enc IND-CPA\$ secure?

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IND-CPA \Rightarrow IND-CPA\$?


- $p \Rightarrow q \equiv \neg q \Rightarrow \neg p$ (contrapositive)
- $\text{IND-CPA} \Rightarrow \text{IND-CPA\$} \equiv \neg \text{IND-CPA\$} \Rightarrow \neg \text{IND-CPA}$

Forwards or backwards, which direction is more appealing?

What is implied by $\neg \text{IND-CPA\$}$?

$\neg IND - CPA\$ \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA ?$

Can be break this game with the help of an adversary that breaks IND-CPA\$?



$$Adv(A) = \Pr[A(Enc(k, m_0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(Enc(k, m_1)) = 1]$$


$\neg IND - CPA\$ \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA ?$



IND-CPA\$
adversary



IND-CPA
adversary




$b = \$, k = \$$


$Enc(k, m_0) \quad b = 0$

$Enc(k, m_1) \quad b = 1$


$\neg IND - CPA\$ \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA ?$




$\neg IND - CPA\$ \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA?$



$\neg IND - CPA\$ \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA?$




$\neg IND - CPA\$ \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA?$



$$Adv(A) = \Pr[A(Enc(k, m_0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(Enc(k, m_1)) = 1] = Adv(\neg IND - CPA\$)$$

Example Homework Question (IND-CPA\$)

- Consider the following game




Question: Let Enc be an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, is Enc IND-CPA\$ secure?

Yes!

Question: Let Enc be an IND-CPA\$ secure encryption scheme, is Enc IND-CPA secure?


$\neg IND - CPA \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA\$?$




$$Adv(A) = \Pr[A(Enc(k, m_0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(Enc(k, \$)) = 1]$$

$$y = Enc(k, \$) \quad b = 1$$


$\neg IND - CPA \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA\$?$



$\neg IND - CPA \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA\$?$




$\neg IND - CPA \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA\$?$



If $b = 0$: This is identical to the IND-CPA game, oracle has $Adv = \epsilon$

if $b = 1$: This oracle was given input that it is not designed to handle, in the worst case it has no advantage at all, just random guessing

$\neg IND - CPA \Rightarrow \neg IND - CPA\$?$




$$Adv(A) = \Pr[A(Enc(k, m_0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(Enc(k, \$)) = 1] = \frac{Adv(\neg IND - CPA)}{2}$$

Takeaway

- There are other equivalent definitions of the IND-CPA security game
 - Left or Right (LoR)
 - Real or Random (RoR)

- Are there stronger definitions?

Real or Random String (IND $\$$ -CPA)



Question: Let Enc be an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, is Enc IND $\$$ -CPA secure?

IND – CPA $\not\Rightarrow$ IND\$ – CPA

- Let **Enc** be an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme that always appends the bit ‘0’ to the ciphertext
- An adversary A can check the last bit of the ciphertext and guess “real” if it is 0, “random” if it is 1

$$Adv(A) = \Pr[A(Enc(k, m_0)) = 1] - \Pr[A(\$) = 1] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2}$$